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Executive branch has attempted to secure the cooperation in this
endeavor of state and local governments and law enforcement
officials across the country. One key tool in the Executive branch’s
toolkit has been the immigration detainer.
The Executive branch uses immigration detainers to control
the release of non-citizens from state prisons and local jails. When
federal immigration officials learn that a state or local law
enforcement agency has custody of a non-citizen targeted for
immigration proceedings or investigation, they issue a detainer to
give notice to state or local officials that the federal government
intends to take custody of the non-citizen upon release. The form
detainer notice issued by federal immigration officials directs the
recipient that federal regulations require the recipient agency to
detain the non-citizen for a brief period of time after the non1
citizen would otherwise be released from custody. Absent the
ability to issue detainers, immigration enforcement officials would
have to be present at the gates of the state or local detention facility
to apprehend the non-citizen upon release.
The Executive’s detainer practices have not yet attracted much
scholarly attention. I hope with this essay to begin a discussion of
current detainer practices and their legality.
I begin with the broad view, examining the recent history of
2
immigration enforcement efforts targeting criminal aliens, and
then focus more narrowly on the Executive’s current detainer
3
practices. I then examine Congress’s grant of detainer authority to
federal immigration officials and consider how the Executive
branch has attempted to expand that authority by implementing
4
regulations. After reviewing the actual authority for the issuance
of immigration detainers, I conclude that the Executive branch has
5
broadly exceeded its mission in the placing of detainers, which aim
to transfer local, state, and federal prisoners to Department of
6
7
Homeland Security (DHS) custody for “removal” proceedings.
1. A sample form detainer notice, Form I-247, is available on PACER. Public
Access to Court Electronic Records, http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/uspci.html
(last visited Dec. 16, 2008). The sample was filed as an exhibit in Sattani v. United
States. Complaint at Ex. A, No. 3:05-CV-0655-H, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14196 (N.D.
Tex. July 15, 2005) (No. 1).
2. See infra Part I.
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part III.
5. See infra Part IV.
6. After passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296,
116 Stat. 2135 (2003), the functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
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Administrative regulations concerning detainers exceed the
authority bestowed upon federal immigration authorities by
Congress. In closing, I briefly consider the various procedural
avenues by which ICE’s abusive detainer practices may be
8
challenged.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF RECENT IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
EFFORTS TARGETING CRIMINAL ALIENS

To understand how important detainers are in the current
efforts to identify, apprehend, and deport criminal aliens, it is
necessary to briefly trace the Executive’s recent history of targeting
criminal aliens for deportation. Deporting criminal aliens has been
9
a priority since at least 1986, but the Executive branch has been
largely unsuccessful in discharging this priority. Non-cooperation
between local and federal government agencies appears to be at
the heart of this malfunction.
10
Following the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act and the
11
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, the INS (and later
DHS) prioritized the apprehension of “criminal aliens” through a
variety of enforcement programs.
The Alien Criminal
Apprehension Program (ACAP) was implemented as a pilot project
in four cities—Chicago, Miami, Los Angeles, and New York—in
December 1986 to investigate, apprehend, and deport criminal
12
aliens. With ACAP, the INS sought to remedy the failures of past
(INS) were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security in March 2003.
The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) assumed detention
and removal operations.
7. Historically, proceedings to oust an unauthorized immigrant from the
country were known as “deportation” proceedings. This terminology was replaced
in 1997, when the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act
of 1996 (IIRIRA) took effect, and now all proceedings to expel immigrants from
the country or prevent them from entering, are labeled “removal” proceedings.
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009–546 (1996). By replacing a word (“deport”)
that requires a human object with another (“remove”) that is usually applied to an
inanimate object, Congress opted for sanitizing language that embodies an
attitude toward unauthorized migration fully consistent with rhetoric that
describes unauthorized immigrants as “illegal.” I indicate my dissatisfaction with
this dehumanizing terminology by avoiding it where possible and by using
quotation marks elsewhere to indicate it is not my terminology.
8. See infra Part V.
9. See infra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
10. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
11. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
12. Criminal Aliens: INS Enforcement: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
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programs under which the INS would not begin deportation
proceedings against a criminal alien until after the alien was
13
sentenced and delivered to prison. Under ACAP, the INS was
called upon to work closely with state and local law enforcement
officials to “help identify and process aliens involved in crimes at
the earliest stages [presumably arrest and arraignment] of the
14
criminal justice system.”
ACAP also called for immigration judges to conduct
proceedings for incarcerated aliens as expeditiously as possible “to
ensure their immediate removal from the country upon their
15
In 1988, the INS launched its “Institutional Hearing
release.”
Program” (IHP), a program later subsumed by the “Institutional
16
Removal Program” (IRP). The objective of the IHP (and later the
IRP) was to establish procedures “to complete the judicial and
administrative review proceedings prior to completion of aliens’
sentences, thereby eliminating the need for further detention by
17
the INS.” The IRP and ACAP were ultimately consolidated under
18
the aegis of DHS’s “Criminal Alien Program.”
Immigration, Refugees and International Law, 101st Cong. 7–8 (1989) (statement of
Lowell Dodge, Director, Administration of Justice Issues, General Government
Division), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d48t13/139869.pdf.
13. Id. at 5–6.
14. Id. at 8.
15. Id.
16. Criminal Aliens: INS' Efforts to Identify and Remove Imprisoned Aliens Continue
to Need Improvement: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims, 106th
Cong. 2 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 GAO Report] (statement of Norman J. Rabkin,
Director, Administration of Justice Issues, General Government Division, U.S.
General Accounting Office), available at http://ftp.fas.org/irp/gao/ggd-99047.htm.
17. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT DIV., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, , NO. 0241, AUDIT REPORT: IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE INSTITUTIONAL
REMOVAL PROGRAM (2002) at 1, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/
reports/INS/a0241/final.pdf [hereinafter 2002 OIG AUDIT REPORT]. With the
passage of IRCA, Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
in 1986 to require the Attorney General to begin deportation proceedings for
criminal aliens “as expeditiously as possible after the date of the conviction.” Pub.
L. No. 99-603, § 701, 100 Stat. 3359, 3345 (amending INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252).
In the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Congress mandated that the Attorney General
“provide for the initiation and, to the extent possible, the completion of
deportation proceedings, and any administrative appeals thereof, in the case of
any alien convicted of an aggravated felony before the alien’s release from
incarceration for the underlying aggravated felony.” Pub. L. No. 100-690,
§ 7347(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4471 (adding INA § 242A, 8 U.S.C. § 1252a).
18. See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities: A
Comprehensive Plan to Identify and Remove Criminal Aliens (March 28, 2008)
[hereinafter Secure Communities], available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/
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The ambitious goals of the Executive’s programs for deporting
“criminal aliens” were hardly realized, however. Scathing criticism
dogged the INS’s programs and revealed underlying state–federal
19
tensions. The General Accounting Office, in 1997 and again in
1999, criticized the ineffectiveness of the IHP/IRP and pointed to
millions of dollars spent on detaining aliens for whom immigration
proceedings were not concluded during their state prison
20
sentences. An audit by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) in
2002 likewise concluded “the INS ha[d] not effectively managed
21
the IRP,” and suggested the blame lay in part on state–federal
22
non-cooperation.
The 2002 OIG audit, after noting past criticism of the INS’s
23
management of the IRP, pointed out that Congress had
24
broadened the universe of deportable criminal aliens such that
“the county jails became a large source of potentially deportable
25
candidates.”
Yet the ability of the INS to apprise itself of the
presence of criminal aliens in local jails was found to be “minimal
at best,” and the Service’s monitoring of state prisons appeared to
26
be in decline.
Failures in administration of the IRP meant
factsheets/ secure_communities.htm.
19. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-807, at 319 (2003) (“INS’s record in removing
criminal aliens from the United States has also been uneven, at best. GAO has
identified criminal alien removal as ‘one of INS’s long-standing challenges.’ The
INS’s experience with its Institutional Hearing Program is indicative of its
inconsistent performance in identifying and removing criminal aliens.”); see also
H.R. REP. NO. 105-636, at 35 (1998) (rejecting the Administration's proposal to
expand the IRP, in light of the INS’s failure to meet program goals despite having
received increased resources for the IRP; noting “less than 30 percent of eligible
prisoners complete IRP processing before they leave prison, and an even smaller
percentage actually are deported.”); H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-479 (1999)
(directing the INS to demonstrate to the Committees on Appropriations that the
IRP gives “priority to aliens imprisoned for serious violent felonies or drug
trafficking,” or “to explain why and to outline the steps [the INS] will take to focus
IRP efforts on the most dangerous incarcerated aliens.”).
20. 1999 GAO Report, supra note 16.
21. 2002 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 17, at ii.
22. Id. at 7 (“The whole IRP process is predicated on the cooperation of the
institutions in which criminal aliens are incarcerated. Without that cooperation,
the IRP cannot function effectively.”).
23. Id. at 4–5.
24. The report notes that in 1996, IIRIRA “greatly expanded” the definition
of “aggravated felony,” making more aliens deportable on that basis. Id. at 6; see
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208 § 321, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000)).
25. 2002 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 17, at 6.
26. Id. at 8, 13–14.
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criminal aliens, whether in county jails or state prisons, were being
27
released prior to processing by INS. The costs to the Service of
incarcerating such aliens after their release from state custody were
28
believed to be as high as $200 million annually.
The 2002 OIG audit and a second OIG audit conducted in
29
2007 provided some insight into the shortcomings of the IRP.
The 2002 audit reported that the IRP’s failings were partially
attributable “to a lack of cooperation on the part of some state and
local governments, despite the fact that they may receive substantial
funding from the federal government in the form of State Criminal
30
(Since 1994, the
Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP) grants.”
federal government has issued SCAAP funds to reimburse states for
31
the costs of incarcerating deportable aliens.
SCAAP has been
grossly underfunded, however, with states typically receiving less
than a quarter of the compensation to which the program would
32
entitle them. )
The 2002 OIG audit recommended explicitly conditioning
SCAAP funding on state cooperation in enforcing federal
33
34
immigration law. But SCAAP funds are payments, not grants,
and the OIG recognized this additional counterargument to its
proposal: “SCAAP funds represent a reimbursement of costs borne
by state and local governments to incarcerate illegal aliens due to
the federal government’s failure to enforce its immigration laws,
35
and therefore grant conditions would be inappropriate.” Efforts
to enact legislation to expand the IRP by conditioning SCAAP
payments on state cooperation with federal immigration
36
enforcement efforts have failed, and SCAAP funding remains
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 21.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT DIV.,
COOPERATION OF SCAAP RECIPIENTS IN THE REMOVAL OF CRIMINAL ALIENS FROM THE
UNITED STATES (2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/OJP/
a0707/ final.pdf [hereinafter 2007 OIG AUDIT REPORT].
30. 2002 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 17, at 17.
31. 2007 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 29, at i–ii.
32. Id. at ii–iii.
33. 2002 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 17, at 17–19.
34. 2007 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 2.
35. 2002 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 17, at 19.
36. E.g., H.R. 6789 § 911, 110th Cong. (2008) (proposing to expand the IRP
to all states, and condition SCAAP payments on a state’s (1) cooperation with IRP
officials; (2) expeditious and systematic identification of criminal aliens in state
prisons and jails; and (3) prompt notification of criminal aliens to IRP officials);
H.R. 4065 § 222, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 6306 § 621, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R.
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largely unconditional.
The 2007 OIG audit, in addition to conducting a rough survey
of a number of state and local jurisdictions, closely examined the
level of cooperation between federal immigration officials and law
enforcement officials in seven jurisdictions in states receiving
37
SCAAP funds.
Not surprisingly, the level of cooperation was
found to vary widely from one jurisdiction to the next.
At one extreme is the “sanctuary city,” the product of
resistance on the local level to federal immigration enforcement
38
Reflecting the “deep ideological divisions” on the
policy.
immigration issue, localities have adopted various policies and
programs to “promote a self-conception as immigrant-friendly”
39
even despite federal immigration policy.
Of particular
importance to the success or failure of the IRP, some cities have
adopted policies or ordinances discouraging or limiting local
40
participation in immigration enforcement.
New Haven,
Connecticut and San Francisco, California are leading examples of
41
the “sanctuary city” concept.
In the 2007 OIG audit, San
Francisco was singled out as the single most non-cooperative
jurisdiction of the seven visited:
According to an agent working at ICE headquarters, the
4437 § 223, 109th Cong. (2005).
37. 2007 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 9–10.
38. See Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 57, 60 (2007) (noting that “the evidence strongly suggests that the largest
immigrant-receiving states, as well as some [other] states, are in fact consistently
more generous to immigrants, even including undocumented ones, than is
Congress”); Max Pfeffer, The Underpinnings of Immigration and the Limits of
Immigration Policy, 41 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 83, 99–100 (2008) (“Because current
national policies are ineffective and national immigration policy reform is absent,
local policies that address immigration issues are likely to become more common
and more important to effectively include immigrants in society.”).
39. Cristina Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation,
106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 596–605 (2008).
40. Id. at 600–05.
41. Both cities have adopted municipal identification card programs that
allow participation without regard for immigration status. Jennifer Medina, New
Haven Approves Program to Issue Illegal Immigrants IDs, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/05/nyregion/05haven.html; Jeff
Holtz, This Summer’s Surprise Hit: An Elm City ID, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/16/nyregion/nyregionspecial2/
16peoplect.html; Javier Erik Olivera, S.F. to Issue ID Cards to Illegal Immigrants: City
Becomes Only the Second in Nation after New Haven, Conn., SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Nov. 21, 2007, available at http://www.mercurynews.com/valley/ci_7522078. The
most recent Congressional bid to expand the IRP also includes a section entitled
“ELIMINATING SANCTURY CITIES.” H.R. 6789 § 921.
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San Francisco County Jail and its administration appear to
have implemented a “bare minimum of cooperation with
ICE and the [Criminal Alien Program] to ensure they are
compliant with state rules and the SCAAP regulations.”
Agents employed by ICE are not permitted to access jail
records without the authorization and approval of the
Sheriff. ICE agents are authorized to enter the jails to
interview prisoners and to access the “all-jail alphabetical
list” of inmates. However, ICE agents do not have the
authorization to access booking cards, housing cards or
42
other jail records, including computers.
At the other end of the spectrum is the state or local
government that has partnered with the federal government by
means of a “287(g) agreement” between local law enforcement
43
These agreements are named after section
agencies and ICE.
44
287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and authorize DHS
to train local law enforcement officials in enforcement of the civil
45
immigration laws.
With such an agreement in place, local law
enforcement officials can carry out the IRP directly. Some ICE
officials have suggested that SCAAP payments to states should be
46
linked to local participation in 287(g) agreements.
Most jurisdictions lie between the two extremes of the
42. 2007 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 10, 18–19 (describing ICE
relationship with San Francisco Sheriff’s Department as “unfriendly and marked
by ‘much animosity’”).
43. Section 287(g) was added as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208 § 133, 110 Stat. 3009
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2000)). In the twelve years since, only sixty-three
agreements have been put in place. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS,
DELEGATION OF IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY, SECTION 287(G), IMMIGRATION AND
NATIONALITY ACT (2008), http://www.ice.gov/partners/287g/Section287_g.htm
[hereinafter DELEGATION OF IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY]. The program’s popularity,
however, may be on the rise—the vast majority of 287(g) agreements came into
being in 2007 or 2008. Id.
44. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)
(2006).
45. In 2006, DHS received $50 million in supplemental funding to pursue
287(g) programs.
2007 State of the Union: President Bush's Plan for
Comprehensive Immigration Reform, http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateofthe
union/2007/initiatives/ immigration.html. According to ICE, the number of
287(g) programs is on the rise, having expanded from thirty-five to sixty-three
already this year. DELEGATION OF IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY, supra note 43. The
Administration reports it is proposing an increase in funding for 287(g) programs
in 2009.
Immigration: Border Security and Immigration Reform,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/immigration/.
46. 2007 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 8.
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sanctuary city and the 287(g) participant, and exhibit varying levels
of cooperation with the federal IRP. The 2007 OIG audit surveyed
47
164 state and local jurisdictions receiving SCAAP funding. Some
jurisdictions reported actively inquiring into an arrestee’s
48
immigration status; a significant minority did not inquire. Most
jurisdictions would, upon developing reason to believe an arrestee
is undocumented, report that fact to ICE, though some
49
jurisdictions would not. Most would not transport a prisoner to
50
an ICE field office.
These findings do not point to a single characteristic local
response to the IRP. OIG broadly reported that “many state,
county, and local law enforcement agencies are unwilling to initiate
immigration enforcement but have policies that suggest they are
willing to cooperate with ICE when they arrest individuals on state
or local charges and learn that those individuals may be criminal
51
aliens.”
Funding is obviously a significant factor—local law
enforcement must “balance any decision to enforce immigration
laws with their daily mission of protecting and serving diverse
communities” by taking into account, among other factors, limited
52
resources. Insufficient SCAAP funding might certainly cause state
and local governments to be less than enthusiastic about
cooperating more fully in the federal government’s immigration
enforcement efforts. In addition to underfunding SCAAP, the
federal government has, at times, appeared uncommitted to the
IRP by not responding to local law enforcement reports of criminal
53
aliens. Several local jurisdictions cited federal non-responsiveness
as a reason that the local jurisdiction did not cooperate more fully
54
with the IRP.
47. Id. at 11. Ninety-nine of the 164 jurisdictions surveyed responded to the
survey. Id.
48. Id. at 10–11. Fifty-nine jurisdictions responded “Yes,” and thirty-four
responded “No”. Id.
49. Id. at 13–14. Seventy-eight jurisdictions responded “Yes,” and only
seventeen responded “No”. Id.
50. Id. at 16–17. Only twenty-three jurisdictions responded “Yes” they would
transport, and seventy responded “No”. Id.
51. Id. at 22–23; see id., app. at 66 (Major Cities Chiefs of Police Statement)
(citing M.C.C. Immigration Committee Recommendations, June 2006).
52. Id. at 22.
53. See id. at 12–13.
54. Id. at 12. One jurisdiction reported inquiring into an arrestee’s
immigration status “[o]nly on domestic battery and felonies, because on other
charges ICE does not respond . . . anymore.” Id.; see id. at 14 (detailing responses
indicating ICE’s frequent failure to pick up identified criminal aliens).
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In March 2008, DHS unveiled its latest program targeting
55
criminal aliens: “Secure Communities.” Although ICE touts an
increase of state and local partnership as the “cornerstone” of the
“Secure Communities” program, it appears that the real innovation
of the program is an effort to increase information sharing between
the FBI and DHS:
Leveraging integration technology that shares law
enforcement data between federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies, ICE is now able to expand
coverage nationwide in a cost effective manner.
Interoperability between the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s (FBI’s) Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System (IAFIS) and DHS’ Automated
Biometric Identification System (IDENT) will help ICE
and local law enforcement officers positively identify
criminal aliens in prisons and jails.
...
Currently, as part of the routine booking process, local
officers submit an arrested person’s fingerprints through
FBI databases to access that individual’s criminal history.
With interoperability, those fingerprints will also
automatically be checked against DHS databases to access
immigration history information. The automated process
would also notify ICE when fingerprints match those of an
immigration violator. ICE officers would conduct follow
56
up interviews and take appropriate action.
Having failed, for some of the reasons mentioned above, to
obtain more than ten percent coverage for the IRP in county jails
57
across the country, it appears that ICE will rely on a technological
solution that links the FBI and ICE biometric databases rather than
on voluntary information sharing between state and federal
58
authorities.
II. DETAINERS IN PRACTICE
Although the failures of the federal government’s Criminal
Alien Program have been attributed to some extent to state–federal
non-cooperation, one area in which there appears to have been

55.
56.
57.
58.

Secure Communities, supra note 18.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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general cooperation between state and federal officials is in the
59
The 2007 OIG survey
processing of immigration detainers.
60
“disclosed a widespread willingness to accept detainers from ICE,”
and to notify ICE before releasing undocumented aliens from
61
custody. Officials in all seven of the local jurisdictions interviewed
by the OIG indicated they accept ICE detainers and notify ICE
62
before releasing undocumented aliens.
ICE officials similarly
reported compliance in the processing of detainers in those seven
63
jurisdictions—even in San Francisco.
To test the subjective reports of state and federal officials, the
OIG reviewed the files of seventy-six criminal aliens discharged
from state custody in the seven jurisdictions studied, and found
overwhelming state compliance with federal immigration
64
detainers. In every instance, state officials timely notified ICE that
65
the alien was in custody and accepted an ICE detainer. In seventy
66
cases, the alien was transferred to ICE custody upon release.
Resistance by state officials to participate in federal
immigration enforcement, then, is entirely absent where it
concerns the receipt of immigration detainers and notification to
ICE prior to release. This is of critical importance for two reasons.
First, state cooperation in processing detainers is the sine qua non
for the Executive’s implementation of its Criminal Alien Program.
Second, state nonresistance has allowed the Executive branch to far
exceed its congressional authorization for issuing detainers.
Detainers are, by and large, the key mechanism for
implementing the federal Criminal Alien Program. In many cases,
59. See 2007 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 15.
60. Id. “Ninety-four of the 99 [jurisdictions responding] reported that they
accept such detainers and the 3 that responded negatively added comments
indicating that they may have misinterpreted the question as asking about the
lodging of ICE prisoners.” Id.
61. Id. at 15–16. Seventy-eight of ninety-nine jurisdictions responding to the
survey indicated they would notify ICE before releasing an undocumented alien
from custody. Id. Of the jurisdictions that responded negatively to the survey
question, it appears at least one would notify ICE if a detainer were placed on the
alien. Id. at 16 (noting negative response to question of notification, qualified
with “unless ICE asks us to”).
62. Id. at 19.
63. Id. at 18–19.
64. See id. at 21.
65. Id.
66. Id.. Of the six aliens not released to ICE custody, five were released to the
custody of other jurisdictions, and the sixth was a Cuban who was paroled into the
country in lieu of repatriation. Id.
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the absence of a functioning detainer process would mean criminal
aliens would be released from state custody to freedom after
serving their sentences. Without detainers, then, ICE would be to a
great extent back to square one with respect to apprehension and
detention of criminal aliens. There are certainly other mechanisms
available to assist in implementing the federal apprehension of
criminal aliens. For example, 287(g) agreements permit local
officials to make civil immigration arrests of criminal aliens upon
67
their release and transport those aliens to ICE detention centers,
and thousands of criminal aliens have reportedly been identified in
68
In addition, under “inter-governmental service
this way.
agreements” (IGSAs), local jails or prisons can be authorized to
69
house prisoners on behalf of DHS. In some 350 IGSA facilities
around the country, transfer of criminal aliens from state custody
to DHS custody can be effectuated simply by lodging a form I-203
70
(order to detain) indicating the transfer of custody. Yet, IGSA
67. Eleanor Stables, State, Local Police Slowly Warming to Immigration
Enforcement, AM. RENAISSANCE, Nov. 7, 2007, available at http://www.amren.com/mt
news/archives/2007/11/state_local_pol.php [hereinafter State, Local Police]
(“[B]efore releasing inmates at the end of their sentence, 287(g)-authorized
officers confirm inmates are illegal immigrants, issue them a court date, and
ensure they are not released when their regular prison term ends.”); see also Carrie
L. Arnold, Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement: State and Local Agreements to
Enforce Federal Immigration Law, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 113, 127–29 (2007) (discussing
287(g) agreements with local jails).
68. Arnold, supra note 67, at 129 (reporting that in the first eight months of a
287(g) agreement, officials in Los Angeles County placed nearly 3,000 detainers
on criminal aliens); see also State, Local Police, supra note 67 (reporting some 30,000
criminal aliens were identified through 287(g) programs in FY 2006); Eleanor
Stables, ICE Looks to Expand Program That Deports Criminal Illegal Immigrants, CQ
POLITICS, Sept. 14, 2007, available at http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.
cfm?docID=hsnews-000002584744 (reporting 25,000 identifications in fiscal years
2006 and 2007). ICE credits the 287(g) program with “identifying more than
70,000 (since January 2006) individuals, mostly in jails, who are suspected of being
in the country illegally.” DELEGATION OF IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY, supra note 43.
69. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOCKED AWAY: IMMIGRATION DETAINEES IN JAILS IN
THE UNITED STATES 10, Summary and Recommendations ch. I (1998), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports98/us-immig/Ins989-02.htm (finding, in 1998, that
60 percent of immigration detainees were housed in local jails pursuant to IGSAs);
see Aaron Terrazas, Immigration Enforcement in the United States, MIGRATION POLICY
INSTITUTE, Oct. 2008, available at http://www.migrationinformation.org/
USFocus/display.cfm ?ID=697) (reporting IGSAs between DHS and over 350 state
and local jails, housing some 65 percent of the detained alien population).
70. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE/DRO DETENTION
STANDARD: ADMISSION AND RELEASE § V(E) (2008), available at http://www.ice.gov/
doclib/PBNDS/pdf/admission_and_release.pdf. The process has been described
as follows:
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facilities account for only slightly more than ten percent of the
71
local jails and prisons around the country.
If, in the future, DHS can in fact take advantage of
technological improvements (“interoperability” with the FBI
databases routinely consulted upon booking by local law
enforcement officers across the country) to screen every arrest
72
nationwide, then the cooperation of local law enforcement in the
detection of criminal aliens will be rendered irrelevant. The only
need for local cooperation will be in the processing of detainers to
allow DHS to apprehend and detain criminal aliens in state or local
73
custody.
The acquiescence of state and local officials to the detainer
process is thus a prerequisite to the effectiveness of the federal
Criminal Alien Program. That state and local officials do not
appear prepared to interpose any significant resistance to
immigration detainers—in contrast to varying levels of
“cooperation” demonstrated with respect to other areas of state–
federal interaction on immigration enforcement—is also important
74
because it has given DHS carte blanche with respect to detainers.
Broadly speaking, what DHS requests, the states will deliver. While
this would ordinarily be consistent with the notion that the federal
75
government has plenary power over immigration enforcement, it
Lieutenant Robert Manley, who supervises intake and release at the Palm
Beach County Sheriff's Office, explained the relationship between the
federal government and the sheriff's office with respect to ICE holds.
When subjects arrive at the jail, federal agents from ICE place in the jail
record a form I-247, which is considered a detainer. This document
requires the recipient to detain an alien for forty-eight hours after the
alien ceases to be in custody on state charges. If a form I-203 is filed, and
the alien has been released from state custody, the alien continues to be
held and is considered to be in federal custody pending deportation
proceedings. At that time, the alien remains in jail as a federal detainee
until ICE takes custody of the alien from the sheriff. The jail receives
monetary consideration pursuant to a contract with the federal
government for holding federal prisoners, which consideration begins to
run after the detainee is booked pursuant to the form I-203.
Ricketts v. Palm Beach County Sheriff, 985 So.2d 591, 592 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2008).
71. See Secure Communities, supra note 18 (reporting that there are about 3,100
local jails around the country where criminal aliens might be found).
72. See id. “ICE estimates that it may take up to two years to develop an
automated process to search and prioritize leads from Interoperability based on
the levels of criminality.” Id.
73. See id.
74. See id; 2007 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 21.
75. See generally, Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78
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has troubling implications here where the Executive branch
wrongly insists upon a “general authority . . . to detain any
76
individual subject to exclusion or deportation proceedings.”
Before examining the flaws in this legal position, it is
important to see how DHS uses detainers in practice. It appears
the detainer practice is widespread and is rapidly expanding as ICE
77
seeks to widen its Criminal Alien Program.
A. Who initiates the detainer process?
DHS describes the Criminal Alien Program as consisting of
teams which “respond to local law enforcement agencies’ requests
to determine the alienage of individuals arrested for crimes and
78
other immigration violators as resources permit.” But it appears
DHS initiates the placing of a detainer in certain instances, and is
not limited solely to responding to local law enforcement agencies’
79
requests. ICE agents routinely “screen” state prison and local jail
80
populations for criminal aliens in a manner that does not appear
to be responsive to local law enforcement requests concerning
81
Some agencies surveyed in the 2007 OIG
specific individuals.
N.Y.U. L. REV. 667, 739–41 (2003) (discussing plenary power doctrine).
76. Enhancing the Enforcement Authority of Immigration Officers, 59 Fed.
Reg. 42406-01 (Aug. 17, 1994) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 242 and 287).
77. See Secure Communities, supra note 18 (noting ICE Criminal Alien Program
teams identified 67,000 more incarcerated criminal aliens in FY 2007 than in FY
2006); see also Brandon Formby, Irving Thrust into U.S. Spotlight by Many ICE Arrests:
Mayor Calls it “Example” for Others; Opponents See Racial Profiling, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Oct. 12, 2007, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/
dws/dn/ latestnews/stories/101307dnmetirvspotlight.2d72e60.html (reporting
“[a] recent spike in the number of detainers placed on Irving [Texas] arrestees”
after local law enforcement began participating in ICE Criminal Alien Program);
Brandon Formby & Scott Farwell, Opposing Groups Rally in Irving over Criminal Alien
Program Deportations, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 14, 2007, available at
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/101407d
nmetirvrally.168b5d56f.html (noting rise in ICE detainers nationwide, with 7,138
detainers reported in October 2006 and 18,628 in August 2007); Michelle
Pirraglia, Suffolk's Criminal Alien Program Nets Results, SUFFOLK LIFE, Feb. 7, 2007,
available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1781151/posts (reporting
rise in aliens “handed over to ICE” from Suffolk County, New York—from 141 in
2005, to 376 in 2006, and 42 in January 2007 alone).
78. See Secure Communities, supra note 18.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., State v. Reyes-Armenta, No. M2004-00419-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL
2804898, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004) (stating that “[t]he codefendants were
then taken to the Sumner County Jail for processing. The officers had made no
attempt to contact federal immigration officials; however, Agent Robert Kinghorn,
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audit accordingly indicated they do not inform ICE when they
believe they have an undocumented alien in custody, because “ICE
agents come to the state or local institution to review files, which . .
82
. obviate[s] the need to inform ICE.”
B. When are detainers placed?
Given the Executive’s goal of identifying criminal aliens at the
earliest possible stages of the criminal process and adjudicating
immigration status before the expiration of a criminal alien’s state
83
prison or jail sentence, it is not surprising that DHS’s practice
appears to be to place a detainer as soon as DHS learns of a
potentially deportable prisoner—in many cases before conviction,
close in time to the alien’s arrest.
Reported practices in Suffolk County, a jurisdiction that
84
willingly cooperates with DHS’s Criminal Alien Program, are likely
85
Local law enforcement officials attempt to obtain
typical.
immigration status information immediately after arrest and during
an immigration officer, happened to be at the Sumner County jail and issued
detainers on the defendants.”).
82. 2007 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 29, at vi. An example of a jurisdiction
in which detainers are not initiated by a request from local law enforcement is
Yamhill County, Oregon. Although ICE “asked [Yamhill County officials] to fax
them every time a foreign-born person was booked in [the] jail,” Yamhill County
declined the invitation, apparently because of a local policy which would prevent
the sheriff’s office from notifying ICE. Amanda Newman, Immigration and Law
Enforcement: Who's Illegal?, NEWBURG GRAPHIC, Sept. 19, 2007, available at
http://www.newberg graphic.com/news/NewsStory2.htm.
Nonetheless, ICE
agents “routinely search inmate rosters throughout the country, running names
and numbers against a database to identify possible illegal aliens” and, despite the
absence of a request from local officials, visit the Yamhill County Jail “one or two
days per week to conduct interviews and follow-up interviews as needed . . . .” Id.
ICE detainers were reported to have been placed on three inmates at the time of
the article. Id.; see also Lou Kilzer, Feds to Check City Jail List: Immigration Agency Will
Look for Illegals Arrested in Denver, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 20, 2005, (reporting
similar procedures in place in Denver, Colorado).
83. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
84. Pirraglia, Suffolk's Criminal Alien Program Nets Results, supra note 77.
85. Reported judicial decisions are not particularly likely to disclose detainer
practices, but cases can certainly be found that indicate DHS’s practice of issuing
detainers before conviction. See, e.g., State v. Sanchez, 853 N.E.2d 283, 285 (Ohio
2006); Ricketts v. Palm Beach County Sheriff, 985 So.2d 591, 592 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2008); People v. Sanduvac, No. C149212, 2007 WL 3054372, at *5 n.4 (Cal.
Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2007); In re Weems, No. M2006-00652-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL
2164150, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 6, 2007); City of Xenia v. Diaz, No. 2003-CA25, 2003 WL 22972039, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2003); People v. Gonzales,
745 P.2d 263, 264 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
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86

the booking process.
After further investigation, local officials
submit a list of names to ICE, which issues detainers, typically
within hours or days before the alien has seen a judge or had bail
87
set on the criminal charges.
C.In what cases are detainers placed?
It appears ICE lodges detainers indiscriminately, regardless of
88
the criminal charges an alien is facing. ICE practices in Irving,
Texas are emblematic of the current administration’s widespread
use of its purported immigration detainer authority. In September
2006, local officials took up ICE’s invitation to participate in the
Criminal Alien Program, and commenced a “24/7 Criminal Alien
Program,” which permitted ICE to conduct “routine” telephone
interviews with inmates of the local jail to determine their
89
immigration status. Over a thirteen-month period, some 1,638
immigration holds were placed in Irving. The vast majority of these
90
cases involved misdemeanor charges, and a significant number of
91
the cases did not involve controlled substance offenses.
D. When does ICE obtain custody of those held on detainers?
Whether ICE routinely takes custody of aliens under detainer
within the period set forth in regulations is a question that calls for
92
further empirical study. In Ochoa v. Bass, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals discussed the issue. The case involved two men

86. Michelle Pirraglia, Criminal Alien Program Launched, SUFFOLK LIFE, Nov. 22,
2006.
87. Id.
88. Save for In re Weems, each of the cases cited in note 86, supra, involved a
detainer placed on an alien not facing controlled substance charges. This is
significant because, as is discussed below, see Part IV, infra, statutory authority for
immigration detainers is limited to cases involving controlled substance arrests.
See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
89. Sergio Chapa, Irving Illegal Immigrants' Charges are mostly Misdemeanors, AL
DIA (Dallas), Oct. 11, 2007, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/
news/local news/stories/101107dnmetirvimmig.31ec7c4.html
90. Only nine percent of those held on detainers were charged with felonies.
Id.
91. Over ten percent of the aliens held on detainers were arrested for driving
without a license or with a suspended or invalid license, and over 16 percent were
held for drunk driving or public intoxication. Chapa, supra note 89. Over 60
percent were held for various misdemeanors, a group defined to include both
drug offenses and non-drug offenses. Id.
92. 181 P.3d 727 (Okla. Crim. App. 2008).
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who appeared before state District Judge Jerry D. Bass on
November 9, 2007, in separate criminal matters. Judge Bass
disposed of each criminal case by imposing a suspended sentence
of imprisonment, but nonetheless remanded the men to the
custody of the local sheriff “as being illegal aliens,” and directed
93
the sheriff to contact immigration authorities. ICE filed detainers
for the two men but failed to pick them up within the time limit
94
imposed by regulations, and apparently never obtained custody.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ordered the release of
the two men on February 7, 2008, after some three months of
95
illegal detention. The court ultimately held: “Once the forty-eight
(48) hour period granted to ICE, by 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2007), for
assumption of custody had lapsed without ICE taking any action on
its detainers, the State no longer had authority to continue to hold
96
Petitioners.”
Aside from Ochoa, there is a dearth of reported cases
concerning the time limits of section 287.7. While it is tempting to
speculate that this signifies ICE’s widespread compliance with those
97
time limits, this may not be so, because in the typical case
involving detention in excess of the 48-hour limit set by the
regulation, an enforcement action will quickly be rendered moot
98
and there will be no reported decision.
93. Id. at 729.
94. Id. at 730.
95. Id. at 734 n.14.
96. Id. at 733.
97. The 2007 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 29. The report documents ICE’s
timely assumption of custody of aliens under detainer and provides some evidence
of ICE’s compliance with regulatory time limits. Id. at 21–22.
98. Ochoa was an unusual case, in that the criminal judge initiated the
immigration enforcement action—the judge directly ordered the sheriff to take
the two aliens into custody and contact immigration. Ochoa, 181 P.3d at 729–30.
Even after ICE failed to take custody of the two men, the local sheriff acted out of
a sense of duty to the local judge, “refus[ing] to release Petitioners due solely to
Judge Bass's detention orders.” Id. at 730.
A more usual case might have been presented had ICE issued detainers
for the two men while their criminal charges were pending, and then failed to take
custody of the men after Judge Bass ordered suspended sentences for the two
men, thereby otherwise releasing them from state custody on the criminal matters.
In such circumstances, filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus would likely
produce one of two outcomes.
First, ICE might take custody promptly upon the filing of the petitions, if
ICE were truly interested in pursuing immigration proceedings. This is exactly
what happened in Baez v. Hamilton County, Ohio, where the petitioner finished
serving his state sentence on September 28, 2007, remained in the custody of the
local sheriff pursuant to an ICE detainer, and filed a petition for writ of habeas
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The tension that arises between state and federal officials with
respect to detainers may be one reason the 48-hour rule is violated
in practice. Where state or local officials and federal immigration
officers each have an interest in an alien, financial interests cause
each agency to attempt to divest itself of custody over the alien.
Federal immigration authorities, for example, have long sought to
enhance the Institutional Hearing Program to provide for the
completion of immigration proceedings before the alien ever leaves
99
state or local custody. Meanwhile, state and local officials, who
receive SCAAP reimbursements of pennies on the dollar for funds
spent incarcerating immigration violators, will make every effort to
100
The contest between
arrange for the release of aliens to DHS.
state and federal officials to see who can avoid paying detention
costs for criminal aliens may well result in DHS not timely assuming
101
But whether detainers are being timely
custody over detainees.
corpus on October 2, 2007. No. 1:07cv821, 2008 WL 161240, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan.
15, 2008). He was released later that afternoon to the custody of ICE. Id.
Second, ICE might decline custody, and the local sheriff (having no other
authority than the immigration detainer for holding the men) would release the
petitioners. This may be what happened in Lopez-Santos v. State of Arkansas and
Benton County Sheriff’s Department, where the petitioner sought release from the
local jail, alleging he was being illegally detained on a putative ICE “hold.” Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus of Petitioner at 2, Lopez-Santos v. State of Arkansas,
No. 5:08-CV-05030-JLH (W.D. Ark. 2008). The district court dismissed the case
because “the Petitioner does not appear to be detained in the Benton County
Detention Center at this time.” Order at 1, Lopez-Santos v. Arkansas, No. 5:08-CV05030-JLH (W.D. Ark. 2008). While this might be another case where ICE
assumed custody, it might also be that the local jail simply released the petitioner.
In either event the case would likely be dismissed as moot. See Baez, 2008
WL 161240, at *1, *4 (dismissing as moot); see also Lopez-Santos, Order at 1
(dismissing as moot).
99. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
100. One local sheriff said: “We don’t want them sitting in jail for a minor
charge, waiting for their court date.” Pirraglia, Criminal Alien Program Launched,
supra note 86.
The sheriff also noted that, once the accused goes before the judge, deals
could be made to expedite the process even further,“Maybe the judge can give
him time served, so we can get him out of our system immediately.” Setting low
bail would also be another way to get illegals to ICE quickly. “Once they post bail,
and the feds have a detainer on him, we can call the feds immediately and hold
onto the guy,” he noted. Id.
101. The incentives may be complicated by other factors. In Frederick County,
Maryland, for example, there is a 287(g) agreement in place along with an
Intergovernmental Service Agreement (IGSA) whereby immigration detainees are
housed in the local detention facility. Nicholas C. Stern, Sheriff updates county on
ICE action, THE FREDERICK NEWS-POST, Oct. 17, 2008, available at http://www.
fredericknewspost.com/sections/storyTools/print_story.htm?storyID=81545&cam
eFromSection=news The Sheriff reports it costs about $7 a day to house an
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processed by DHS is a question ripe for empirical study.
III. AUTHORITY TO ISSUE IMMIGRATION DETAINERS – ACTUAL AND
IMAGINED
Congress’s statutory grant of authority to issue detainers in
immigration matters is closely linked to America’s “War on Drugs.”
In a subtitle of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 titled the
102
“Narcotics Traffickers Deportation Act,” Congress granted its
only explicit authorization for immigration detainers. The statute
provides:
Detainer of aliens for violation of controlled substances laws.
In the case of an alien who is arrested by a Federal, State,
or local law enforcement official for a violation of any law
relating to controlled substances, if the official (or
another official)—
(1) has reason to believe that the alien may not have
been lawfully admitted to the United States or
otherwise is not lawfully present in the United States,
(2) expeditiously informs an appropriate officer or
employee of the Service authorized and designated
by the Attorney General of the arrest and of facts
concerning the status of the alien, and
(3) requests the Service to determine promptly
whether or not to issue a detainer to detain the alien,
the officer or employee of the Service shall promptly
determine whether or not to issue such a detainer.
If such a detainer is issued and the alien is not otherwise
detained by Federal, State, or local officials, the Attorney
General shall effectively and expeditiously take custody of
103
the alien.
Curiously, the practice of the Executive branch issuing
immigration detainers long predates Congress’s explicit grant of
statutory authority. In cases as far back as 1950, the subjects of INS
detainers have raised questions concerning this restraint on
104
The INS’s form detainer (Form I-247 “Immigration
liberty.
immigration detainee; under the IGSA, they get paid about $95 a day. Id. Thus,
local immigration enforcement and detention is a profitable business—as
described by the Sheriff, “the kind of thing we need in a tight economy.” Id.
102. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1751(d), 100 Stat. 3207, 3207 (1986).
103. Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) (2006).
104. E.g., Slavik v. Miller, 89 F. Supp. 575 (W.D. Pa. 1950), aff'd 184 F.2d 575
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Detainer–Notice of Action”) dates back at least to 1983, years
105
before congressional authorization for immigration detainers.
The INS also appears to have engaged in the practice of simply
serving a copy of the “Order to Show Cause”—then the charging
document in an immigration proceeding—on the prison warden
106
where the alleged undocumented immigrant was housed.
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) of 1986 thus posed a
problem for the INS—despite the Service’s longstanding assertion
(through its practices) of a broad authority to issue detainers, the
1986 Act seemed clearly to narrow any grant of detainer authority.
The INS’s response was ultimately to promulgate regulations
consistent with its historical practice, and far in excess of
Congress’s authorization.
Shortly after passage of the ADAA of 1986, the INS put in
place interim regulations addressing the procedure for issuing
detainers. With these regulations, the INS purported to implement
not only the ADAA’s provisions but also provisions of the
107
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986.
IRCA,
however, did not specifically authorize the INS to issue detainers.
Nonetheless, the INS proceeded from IRCA’s command “that the
Attorney General must expeditiously commence deportation
proceedings against an alien upon conviction of an offense for
which he or she is rendered amenable to deportation from the
108
United States,” and responded with regulations that authorized
(3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 955 (1951); Chung Young Chew v. Boyd, 309
F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1962); In re Lehder, 15 I. & N. Dec. 159 (BIA 1975). The
legality of immigration detainers as a general matter does not appear to have been
decided. In Slavik and Chung Young Chew, the courts held, as a procedural matter,
that individuals against whom an immigration detainer was placed while serving a
state prison sentence were in the technical custody of INS. Slavik, 89 F. Supp. at
576; Chung Young Chew, 309 F.2d at 861. Lehder presents the current prevailing
view—before expiration of the criminal sentence under which an alien is held,
immigration authorities do not have custody for purposes of a habeas corpus
proceeding. In re Lehder, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 161; see also Zolicoffer v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 315 F.3d 538 (5th Cir. 2003).
105. Immigration Forms, 54 Fed. Reg. 39336-02, 39337 (Sept. 26, 1989) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 299) (referring to Form I-247 with date of Mar. 1, 1983);
Jonathan E. Stempel, Note, Custody Battle: The Force of U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service Detainers over Imprisoned Aliens, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 741, 742
n.10 (1990/1991) (including a copy of the Form I-247 reproduced at Appendix A
of the Note)).
106. E.g., Fernandez-Collado v. I.N.S., 644 F. Supp. 741, 742 (D. Conn. 1986);
see Stempel, supra note 105, at 742 n.11.
107. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
108. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 52 Fed. Reg. 16370-01, 16371
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the filing of detainers “against any alien amenable to proceedings
109
under any provision of the law.”
The regulations purportedly implementing IRCA were lodged
in part 242 of title 8. Meanwhile, in part 287, the INS placed
regulations implementing the ADAA’s statutory detainer scheme.
In contrast to the sweeping grant of detainer authority embodied
in part 242’s regulations, those in part 287 more carefully tied the
110
detainer authority to Congress’s grant of authority in the ADAA.
In putting in place these interim regulations following the
ADAA of 1986 and IRCA, the INS professed a desire to “ensure that
Service operations are conducted in a manner consistent with the
111
Certainly, the regulations in
Congressional intent of both Acts.”
part 242 track IRCA’s command to “expeditiously commence
112
deportation proceedings against an alien upon conviction.”
Though finding detainer authority where none was granted, the
authority embodied in the part 242 regulations could be reasonably
read as limited to cases of convicted aliens. Additionally, the
113
regulations in part 287 hew closely to the ADAA. In short order,
however, the differences between the two parts dissolved and the
regulations came to embody the generally unbound detainer
practice the INS had enjoyed before the ADAA.
In the final version of the regulations, specific references to
the enabling statutes were removed, and the language of the
detainer regulations in part 242 was identical to that used in part
114
287.
The INS described the regulations of part 242 as a
(May 5, 1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 242) (quoting Pub. L. No. 99-603,
§ 701, 100 Stat. 3359, 3359 (1986)).
109. 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(a)(2) (1987).
110. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(b)(1) (1987) (“In complying with the provisions of
section 287(d)(3) of the Act, an officer of the Service shall not issue a detainer
against an alien unless the alien is amenable to deportation proceedings under
any provision of law at the time the detainer is issued.”).
111. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 52 Fed. Reg. 16370-01, 16370
(May 5, 1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 242).
112. The regulations specified what would constitute a “conviction” and what
would amount to “commenc[ing] [deportation] proceedings.” 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(g)
(1987). Additionally, the regulations specifically referred to IRCA’s amendments
by referencing section 242(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 C.F.R.
§ 242.2(a)(3) (1988).
113. The regulations defined the terms “arrested,” "law enforcement official
(or another official)," and “controlled substance,” all of which are found in the
ADAA. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (1988). The regulations also specifically referred to the
ADAA by referencing section 287(d)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 8
C.F.R. § 287.7(c) (1987).
114. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 53 Fed. Reg. 9281-01 (Mar. 22,
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“codif[ication of] the authority of the Service to issue detainers.”
In 1994, responding to comments that the regulations went far
beyond the limited statutory authority for issuing immigration
detainers—that embodied in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986—the
INS made clear that the regulations in parts 242 and 287 were
meant to embody the general detainer practice of the pre-ADAA
era:
The commenters stated that the authority for issuance of
detainers in §§ 242.2(a)(1) and 287.7(a)(1) of the
proposed rule was overly broad because the authority to
issue detainers is limited by section 287(d) of the Act to
persons arrested for controlled substances offenses. This
comment overlooked the general authority of the Service
to detain any individual subject to exclusion or
deportation proceedings.
See 8 U.S.C. 1225(b),
1252(a)(1). The detainer authority of these sections of the
proposed rule were promulgated pursuant to this general
authority. The statutory provision cited by the commenters
places special requirements on the Service regarding the
detention of individuals arrested for controlled substance
offenses, but does not delimit the general detainer
116
authority of the Service.
The INS thus rewrote history, ignoring the ancestry of the
detainer regulations in parts 242 and 287—the ADAA and IRCA of
1986. Having eliminated any differences between the two parts, the
117
INS removed part 242 in 1997 and reserved it for future use. Part
287—originally tied to the ADAA—now stands as the sole set of
regulations on detainers, and in the INS’s view codifies the pre118
ADAA “general detainer authority of the Service.”

1988) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 242).
115. Id. at 9282.
116. Enhancing the Enforcement Authority of Immigration Officers, 59 Fed.
Reg. 42,406, 42,411 (Aug. 17, 1994) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 242) (emphasis
added).
117. Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of
Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 1031201 (Mar. 6, 1997) (to be codified in scattered sections of 8 C.F.R.).
118. Enhancing the Enforcement Authority of Immigration Officers, 59 Fed.
Reg. 42406-01 (Aug. 17, 1994) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 242 and 287).
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IV. DHS GROSSLY EXCEEDS THE LIMITS OF ITS AUTHORITY TO ISSUE
DETAINERS
DHS routinely exceeds Congress’s explicit grant of authority in
two ways—by lodging immigration detainers without an initiating
request from local law enforcement officials, and by placing
detainers on persons who have not been arrested for controlled
119
substance offenses.
A. DHS exceeds Congress’s statutory grant of detainer authority by
initiating the detainer process rather than waiting for local law enforcement
officials to request a detainer.
The plain language of the Narcotics Traffickers Deportation
Act (NTDA)—that portion of the ADAA of 1986 in which Congress
authorized the issuance of immigration detainers—requires the
immigration detainer process to be initiated from outside DHS.
The two necessary steps for the issuance of a detainer are: first, a
“Federal, State, or local law enforcement official,” makes an arrest
for a controlled substance offense; and second, “the official (or
another official) . . . requests the Service to determine promptly
120
whether or not to issue a detainer. . . .”
119. Further claims may arise with respect to the “48-hour” rule embodied in
the regulation concerning detainers. First, as noted above, it is not clear whether
DHS regularly complies with the timing provisions of the detainer regulation.
Second, the regulation may be infirm in that it allows for prolonged detention
without a determination of probable cause. Commentators have persuasively
argued that regulations establishing procedures following warrantless arrests by
the immigration authorities fail the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of prompt
review to establish probable cause by a neutral examiner. Shirley Huey et al.,
Administrative Comment – Indefinite Detention Without Probable Cause: A Comment on
INS Interim Rule 8 C.F.R. § 287.3, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 397, 402–11
(2000-01); but see Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02 CV 2307(JG), 2006 WL 1662663, at
*46 (E.D.N.Y June 14, 2006) (“[T]he application of County of Riverside’s 48-hour
rule to this context is certainly not clearly established”). The regulations on
detainers do not require DHS to establish probable cause before issuing a detainer.
8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (2002) (“Any authorized Service officer may at any time issue a
Form I-247, Immigration Detainer-Notice of Action, to any other Federal, State, or
local law enforcement agency.”); but see 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(c) (2002) (requiring state
or local law enforcement agencies to provide documentation to DHS “[i]n order
for the Service to accurately determine the propriety of issuing a detainer”). The
regulations allow for a period of 48 hours, not including weekends and holidays,
before ICE must assume custody of an alien held by state or local officials. 8
C.F.R. § 287.7(d). The exclusion of weekends and holidays from the 48 hours for
probable cause hearings was held presumptively unreasonable in County of
Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 57 (1991).
120. INA § 287(d) (2008), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) (2006) (emphasis added).
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The regulation, however, ignores the statutory language
specifying how detainers are initiated, instead giving broad
authority to DHS: “Any authorized Service officer may at any time
issue a Form I-247, Immigration Detainer–Notice of Action, to any
121
other Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency.”
It might conceivably be argued that “authorized immigration
officers” under the regulation enjoy statutory authority to initiate
detainers because the statute allows detainers to be initiated not
only by the arresting official, but also by “another official.” This
argument fails for three reasons.
First, the phrase “another official” must be construed, under
ordinary canons of statutory interpretation, to mean another
official similar to the arresting official. The principle of ejusdem
generis means that “‘[w]here general words follow specific words in
a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to
embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated
122
To read “the official (or
by the preceding specific words.’”
another official)” as broadly permitting any official to initiate the
detainer process would require reading the words “another official”
123
so broadly as to render the words “the official” surplusage.
Congress might as well have written the statute to allow “any
official” to initiate the detainer process. Instead, Congress likely
recognized that as a practical matter it might make sense for a law
enforcement official other than the arresting officer—another
officer on the same police force, for example, or a booking officer
at the local jail—to initiate the detainer process.
Second, the structure of the NTDA makes clear that the
“official” who must initiate the detainer request is outside DHS. The

121. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (2002).
122. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114–15 (2001) (quoting
2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 47.17 (1991)).
123. In Circuit City Stores, the Court considered section 1 of the Federal
Arbitration Act, which excludes from the Act’s coverage “contracts of employment
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). The Court rejected a broad reading of
the last clause: “Construing the residual phrase to exclude all employment
contracts fails to give independent effect to the statute’s enumeration of the
specific categories of workers which precedes it; there would be no need for
Congress to use the phrases ‘seamen’ and ‘railroad employees’ if those same
classes of workers were subsumed within the meaning of the ‘engaged in . . .
commerce’ residual clause.” Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 114. The same logic
applies here.
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initiating official must “expeditiously inform[] an appropriate officer
or employee of the Service authorized and designated by the Attorney
General of the arrest and of facts concerning the status of the
124
alien.”
The distinction between federal, state and local law
enforcement officials and officers or employees of the INS is
maintained throughout the statute. Congress clearly intended the
initiation of detainers to begin with the arresting law enforcement
agency.
There are substantial reasons why Congress may have
structured the NTDA to authorize state and local law enforcement
agencies—and not DHS officers or employees—to initiate the
detainer process.
First, Congress may have allocated control over the initiation
of immigration detainers to local law enforcement agencies to draw
on those agencies’ expertise in criminal matters. The NTDA was
passed to further the “War on Drugs,” and it makes sense that
Congress delegated enforcement priorities to the soldiers on the
front lines—law enforcement officers making controlled substance
arrests. The NTDA grants discretion to law enforcement agents to
request an immigration detainer, indicating a practical recognition
that it is simply not possible to deport all non-citizens charged with
drug offenses. Law enforcement agents making drug arrests are in
a better position than federal immigration officials to evaluate the
seriousness of the criminal conduct and exercise sensible discretion
as to which drug arrestees ought to be selected for immigration
enforcement.
Second, Congress may have given state and local officials the
authority to initiate the detainer process as a matter of comity.
Congress provided for reimbursement to states under SCAAP,
recognizing the burdens on states caused by the federal
125
government’s immigration enforcement failures.
Similarly,
Congress may have recognized that processing immigration
detainers imposed a burden on the states, and accordingly left the
decision to initiate detainers on state and local officials, to allow
them some control over the burdens of participation in
immigration enforcement.
Third, Congress likely allocated the authority to initiate the
detainer process to state and local officials because there is a
124. INA § 287(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) (2006) (emphasis added).
125. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text. See also H.R. REP. NO. 103645 (1994). Of course, the NTDA predated Congress’s implementation of SCAAP.
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substantial question—deserving of further study—as to whether
Congress could lawfully authorize a federal administrative agency
to unilaterally issue detainers for state prisoners.
In federal criminal cases, the court may obtain the presence of
a state prisoner in either of two ways—via the Interstate Agreement
126
on Detainers (IAD), or by means of a writ of habeas corpus ad
127
128
The two procedures are quite different.
The
prosequendum.
writ of habeas corpus commands the state custodian to immediately
produce the prisoner in federal court, while a detainer merely
serves as a “‘notification filed with the institution in which a
prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face
129
pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction.’”
The IAD,
however, additionally includes provisions intended to facilitate
expeditious processing of detainers before expiration of a
prisoner’s sentence.
Neither procedure would ordinarily be available to an
administrative agency such as DHS, and it is uncertain whether
Congress could give DHS such power. The IAD is an interstate
compact to which Congress has, with its approval, lent the force of
130
federal law, but which does not, by its terms, apply to DHS civil
131
immigration proceedings.
The IAD is a multi-jurisdictional
agreement that requires the participating states to grant certain
privileges to all other participants (such as the ability to obtain a
prisoner’s presence for adjudication of a criminal case) in
exchange for receiving reciprocal privileges from those other
132
Congress could not unilaterally grant to a single
participants.
jurisdiction the powers vested in the IAD, and it is unlikely
126. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2.
127. See United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978) (discussing both
Interstate Agreement on Detainers and writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum).
128. Id. at 358 (“The role and functioning of the ad prosequendum writ are
rooted in history, and they bear little resemblance to the typical detainer which
activates the provisions of the [Interstate] Agreement.”).
129. Id. at 359 (citation omitted).
130. See Leslie W. Abramson, The Interstate Agreement on Detainers: Narrowing its
Availability and Applications, 21 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 5–6
(1995).
131. See United States v. Gonzalez-Mendoza, 985 F.2d 1014, 1016 (9th Cir.
1993) (holding that the IAD applies only to pending criminal charges in another
jurisdiction and that “the courts have declined to treat deportation as a criminal
proceeding”).
132. See Note, The Compact Clause and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1958, 1969–71 (2007) (discussing the nature of interstate
compacts).
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Congress could unilaterally grant detainer power to DHS for the
133
same reason.
The power to issue a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is
134
Whether
bestowed upon the federal district courts by Congress.
Congress could bestow a like power upon an administrative agency
is a question worthy of study. By the language of the NTDA,
however, it is apparent that Congress did not intend to give DHS
the power to issue writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, but
rather to give DHS the ability to secure the presence of an alien
through a detainer similar to those employed in criminal matters
under the IAD. The state and local governments affected by DHS
detainers have not, of course, joined a compact which would assure
them mutual privileges and obligations. Accordingly, Congress
drafted the NTDA to require state and local law enforcement to
consent to the placing of each detainer, by initiating the detainer
135
process.
DHS’s practice of screening jail and prison rosters and sua
sponte issuing detainers, without the request of a local law
enforcement agency, is contrary to the NTDA. To the extent the
detainer regulation purports to empower immigration officers to
issue detainers “at any time,” without prompting by state or local
136
officials,
the regulation exceeds the authority granted by
Congress.

133. To the extent a detainer serves as nothing more than notification of
DHS’s desire to take custody of a state prisoner at the conclusion of her sentence,
it does not appear to impinge upon the rights of the state. But the regulations
implementing the NTDA state that “for an alien not otherwise detained” by a local
agency, “such agency shall maintain custody of the alien . . . in order to permit
assumption of custody by the Department.” 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2002) (emphasis
added).
134. See generally Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611 (1961). The Suspension
Clause of the Constitution pertains not to the writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum, but rather to the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, which is the
writ that tests the validity of a prisoner’s restraint. Id. at 614–15.
135. In 2005, Representative Charles Norwood (R-Georgia) proposed an
expansion of the IRP which would include authorization for state and local lawenforcement officers to “issue a detainer that would allow aliens who have served a
State prison sentence to be detained by the State prison until personnel from U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement can take the alien into custody.” H.R.
REP. NO. 109-350 at 27 (2005) (proposed amendment to H.R. 4437 § 214). It is
noteworthy that Representative Norwood did not suggest DHS be authorized to
issue a detainer binding upon state and local entities.
136. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (2008).
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B. DHS exceeds Congress’s statutory grant of detainer authority by placing
detainers on individuals who have not been arrested for controlled substance
offenses.
Although DHS’s statutory grant of authority for issuing
detainers is strictly limited to aliens arrested for controlled
substance offenses, DHS routinely places detainers against aliens
who were not arrested for controlled substance offenses. It does so
pursuant to regulations initially passed to implement the NTDA,
but subsequently interpreted by the INS to have been a codification
of a hitherto unspecified “general authority of the Service to detain
137
any individual subject to exclusion or deportation proceedings.”
These regulations exceed the statutory authorization of Congress
and are ultra vires.
The notion that DHS’s “general authority” to detain supports
an expansive power to issue detainers is fatally flawed. Similar logic
would lead to the conclusion that immigration judges have the
power to issue writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, by virtue
of their authority to adjudicate—but even federal district judges
138
lack such authority absent a statutory grant by Congress.
Similar
logic would also lead to the conclusion that DHS has unlimited
subpoena power, by virtue of its broad investigatory powers—yet it
is clear that DHS’s subpoena power derives from Congress and not
139
As with these other
from any inherent investigatory powers.
procedural mechanisms for compelling the presence of witnesses,
the authority to issue detainers must flow from a statutory grant of
140
authority.
Were the Executive branch empowered to issue detainers
pursuant to a “general authority” to detain, the NTDA’s explicit
grant of authority to issue detainers for aliens arrested for
137. Enhancing the Enforcement Authority of Immigration Officers, 59 Fed.
Reg. 42406-01 (Aug. 17, 1994) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 242, 287).
138. See United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 360 (1978).
139. See United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 183 (1956) (Congress’s grant of
power to INS to subpoena “witnesses” did not extend to include respondents in
denaturalization proceedings); Peters v. United States, 853 F.2d 692, 696 (9th Cir.
1988) (stating “[t]he authority of an administrative agency to issue subpoenas for
investigatory purposes is created solely by statute.”).
140. As is shown above, see supra note 134 and accompanying text, it is unlikely
that Congress could have authorized DHS to exercise unilateral detainer power
over the States.
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controlled substance offenses would be superfluous.
Even
assuming the correctness of the proposition that Congress granting
the Executive branch “general authority” to detain also implicitly
authorized the issuance of detainers to effectuate that “general
authority,” that broad implicit authorization could not survive the
NTDA, in which Congress granted a specific, narrow detainer
141
authority.
The decision by Congress to limit detainers to cases involving
controlled substance offenses was a reasoned policy decision.
Because Congress had not previously authorized the issuance of
immigration detainers, it made sense for Congress to begin by
granting limited authority. Furthermore, given the scope of the
criminal alien “problem,” and the limited resources available for
immigration enforcement, it would have been appropriate for
Congress to set priorities—and to attempt to limit the burden on
state and local agencies that would be occasioned by an unlimited
use of detainers. It also was typical of the times that Congress—in
the midst of a national “War on Drugs”—should have singled out
drug offenders as the most appropriate targets of enforcement
efforts.
The Executive’s assertion of a broad authority to issue
detainers, then, does not square with Congress’s limited statutory
grant of authority, and is in fact inconsistent with Congress’s policy
decisions. Furthermore, the regulations do not appear to support
the Executive’s assertion of authority.
The argument that the present regulations authorizing
detainers implement a “general authority” to detain is inconsistent
with the history of the regulations. There were no regulations
authorizing the INS to issue immigration detainers prior to the
141. As the Court wrote in Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143 (2000):
At the time a statute is enacted, it may have a range of plausible
meanings. Over time, however, subsequent acts can shape or focus those
meanings. The “classic judicial task of reconciling many laws enacted
over time, and getting them to ‘make sense’ in combination, necessarily
assumes that the implications of a statute may be altered by the
implications of a later statute.” United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453
(1988). This is particularly so where the scope of the earlier statute is
broad but the subsequent statutes more specifically address the topic at
hand. As we recognized recently in United States v. Estate of Romani, “a
specific policy embodied in a later federal statute should control our
construction of the [earlier] statute, even though it ha[s] not been
expressly amended.” 523 U.S. 517, 530–531 (1998).
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passage of the ADAA and IRCA in 1986. Following those
enactments, regulations were added authorizing the issuance of
detainers—part 287 pursuant to ADAA, and part 242 pursuant to
142
IRCA.
The INS was quite clear that the regulations were meant
143
Only after receiving
to implement the ADAA and IRCA.
comments complaining that the regulations went far beyond the
statutory authorization did the Executive branch claim that those
regulations specifically enacted to implement the NTDA were in
fact enacted to implement the Executive’s “general authority” to
detain. The claim is disingenuous and completely devoid of
historical support.
DHS’s routine practice of placing detainers on persons not
arrested for controlled substance offenses is unsupported by
statutory authority. Even if one assumes: (a) the validity of the
regulations of the now withdrawn part 242, purporting to authorize
detainers pursuant to IRCA’s command “that the Attorney General
must expeditiously commence deportation proceedings against an
alien upon conviction of an offense for which he or she is rendered
144
amenable to deportation from the United States,” and (b) that
those regulations were somehow incorporated in part 287 before
they were withdrawn; such a scheme would only authorize the
placing of a detainer “upon conviction”—whereas DHS commonly
places detainers against persons who have yet to be convicted of
anything.
For all these reasons, the regulations authorizing detainers are
ultra vires, and DHS’s detainer practices are unauthorized, except
in cases of controlled substance arrests where the detainer process
is initiated by the arresting officer or similar official.

142. Because Congress did not mention detainers in IRCA, the regulations in
Part 242 were patently ultra vires. Congress demonstrated in the ADAA of 1986
that it knew how to grant the power to issue detainers when it wished to do so, and
the absence of detainers from IRCA indicates Congress did not wish IRCA’s
provisions to be enforced by means of detainers. See, e.g., Lehman v. Nakshian,
453 U.S. 156, 162 (1981) (“Section 15 contrasts with § 7(c) . . . which expressly
provides for jury trials. Congress accordingly demonstrated that it knew how to
provide a statutory right to a jury trial when it wished to do so . . . . But in § 15 it
failed explicitly to do so.”). At any rate, the regulations authorizing detainers
pursuant to IRCA were later withdrawn. See supra note 117 and accompanying
text.
143. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
144. Documentary Requirements: Nonimmigrants, 52 Fed. Reg. 16370-01 (May
5, 1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 212, 241, 224, 278) (quoting Pub. L. 99-603,
Title VII, § 701 (1986)).
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V. CONCLUSION
This essay seeks to inspire others to undertake further
empirical and legal analysis of the Executive’s current detainer
practices. It is possible, however, despite the brevity of this
investigation, to see there are serious flaws in the Executive’s
argument that it possesses a broad general authority to issue
immigration detainers. Myriad legal strategies may be invoked to
challenge the issuance of detainers beyond Congress’s
authorization and the detention of individuals beyond the 48-hour
145
period. Such strategies might include: informal advocacy with
146
state or federal officials; a motion to the local criminal court
147
a motion in
responsible for sentencing the non-citizen;
148
immigration court to suppress evidence
or terminate the
149
or to be released from mandatory no-bond
proceedings,
145. My list is not intended to be exhaustive.
146. For example, in Mahawa Conde’s case, Ms. Conde was serving a federal
sentence and an immigration detainer had been lodged. Advocates, including law
student interns from the Yale Law School’s Jerome N. Frank Legal Services
Organization, prevailed upon ICE to take into account the unique circumstances
of the case, and ICE agreed to temporary release. Ms. Conde was not taken into
custody on the detainer. Lucy Nalpathanchil, Yale Law Students Request Temporary
Release of Pregnant Immigrant, (WNPR-Connecticut Public Radio May 5, 2008)
available at http://www.cpbn.org/yale-law-students-request-temporary-releasepregnant-immigrant; Danny Jacobs, Immigrant Mother Gets 3-Month Reprieve, THE
DAILY NEWS (Baltimore), May 12, 2008.
147. A local judge who has just ordered the release of a defendant on bond, or
sentenced a defendant to probation, for example, might well be receptive to the
argument that an ICE detainer preventing execution of the judge’s order or
sentence is invalid. Just as the local judge’s order to detain the two men in Ochoa
v. Bass was obeyed by the local sheriff, one can expect that a local judge’s order
directing the release of an inmate notwithstanding an ICE detainer would be
followed. See 181 P.3d 727, 729.
148. See generally, I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984)
(holding that suppression of evidence is available in immigration proceedings
where Fourth Amendment violations are “egregious” or “widespread”). See also
United States v. Fullerton, 187 F.3d 587, 590–92 (6th Cir. 1999) (remedy for
violation of County of Riverside is either application of the exclusionary rule or a
Bivens action), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1127 (2000); cf. Fernandez-Perez v. Gonzales,
226 F.App’x 737, 739 (9th Cir. 2007) (denying suppression remedy for violation of
48-hour rule of 8 C.F.R. section 287.7 where statements sought to be suppressed
preceded rule violation).
Empirical study of DHS’s detainer practice is
particularly important because “widespread” violations are a ground for
suppression under Lopez-Mendoza. See 468 U.S. at 1050.
149. See, e.g., Waldron v. I.N.S., 17 F.3d 511, 517–18 (2d Cir. 1994) (“When a
regulation is promulgated to protect a fundamental right derived from the
Constitution or a federal statute, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service
fails to adhere to it, the challenged deportation proceeding is invalid.”); NATIONAL

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008

31

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 13
6 LASCH - KATE PROOFED.DOC

2008]

ENFORCING LIMITS ON AUTHORIZING DETAINERS

detention;

150

a petition for writ of habeas corpus;

151

195

or a civil

LAWYERS GUILD, IMMIGR. LAW & CRIMES § 8:7 (2008) (suggesting violation of the 48hour rule of 8 C.F.R. section 287.7 would support termination).
150. The Immigration and Nationality Act requires DHS (with very limited
exceptions) to hold without bond those who are placed in immigration
proceedings who have been convicted of a “crime involving moral turpitude” for
which a sentence of at least one year was imposed, multiple crimes involving moral
turpitude, an “aggravated felony,” a controlled substance offense, or one of certain
enumerated offenses involving firearms or implicating national security. INA
§ 226(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006). To avail itself of the no-bond provisions of
the INA, however, DHS must take an immigration respondent into custody “when
the alien is released . . . .” INA § 226(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2006). The
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has recently interpreted the “when released”
provision as unconnected to the criminal offenses which form the basis for nobond detention; thus, an alien jailed briefly for an unpaid parking ticket may be
subject to no-bond detention “when released” from jail, on the basis of a
controlled substance offense occurring many years prior. In re Saysana, 24 I. & N.
Dec. 602 (BIA 2008). The validity of this interpretation has been called into
question, however. The respondent in In re Saysana obtained habeas corpus relief,
with the federal district court finding the Board’s interpretation erroneous and
holding Saysana entitled to an individualized bond determination. Saysana v.
Gillen, No. 1:08-cv-11749-RGS (D. Mass. Dec. 1, 2008) (No. 17, Order on
Petitioner’s Emergency Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus).
Importantly, In re Saysana suggests that mandatory no-bond detention
pursuant to the “when released” provision may not be available to DHS if it is
obtained by DHS unlawfully placing a detainer on the alien. The BIA did note
that “Congress could reasonably expect that many aliens falling within the ambit
of section 236(c)(1) would be immediately taken into DHS custody through
detainers or similar arrangements following their incarceration or arrest by State
or Federal authorities.” In re Saysana, at n.6. The BIA, however, pointedly
reserved the question whether the “when released” requirement for no-bond
detention is satisfied “when an alien shows that an arrest was unlawful and the
release from an unlawful detention has triggered the mandatory detention
provisions of the Act.” Id. at n.7. It appears, therefore, that in cases where DHS
obtains cusody of the respondent through a detainer and then invokes the
mandatory no-bond detention provisions of INA § 226(c), the legality of the
detainer may be challenged in immigration proceedings, or in federal habeas
corpus proceedings such as took place in Saysana’s case. See Saysana v. Gillen, at 3,
n.3 (noting that “the BIA’s opinion gives no guidance as to the forum in which a
person situated similarly to the petitioner would have the opportunity to litigate
the lawfulness of his arrest.”).
151. The timing of a habeas action is a matter of some delicacy. If brought
before expiration of the state or local sentence, the existence of an immigration
detainer does not necessarily serve to place the prisoner in the custody of DHS for
purposes of habeas corpus. See, e.g., Zolicoffer v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 315 F.3d
538, 539–40 (5th Cir. 2003). After expiration of the sentence, when the prisoner
is held in state or local custody solely pursuant to the detainer, it would seem a
habeas petition should be available to test the legality of the detainer. See PerezGarcia v. Vill. of Mundelein, No. 04 C 7216, 2005 WL 991783, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 2005)
(noting that after expiration of the criminal sentence, local officials are required to
maintain custody of the alien pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d)), but there is a
question of who the proper respondent would be. See also Kendall v. I.N.S., 261 F.
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damages action.
In setting limits on the Executive’s authority to issue detainers,
Congress expressed its enforcement priorities, and may have
considered the burdens of widespread detainer practices on state
prisons and local jails. DHS, not content to limit its use of
detainers to cases involving controlled substance arrests, has used
detainers to implement an enforcement strategy broader than that
shared by Congress, and is acting illegally in an attempt to achieve
its own enforcement goals.

Supp. 2d 296, 301 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“As the Second Circuit has indicated, the
INS might have ‘technical custody’ prior to the assumption of physical custody,
but only in cases where deportation proceedings have already resulted in
‘determinations of deportability’ and the detainers ‘require [] the deportees to be
turned over to INS custody for deportation . . . .’”) (citations omitted).
Furthermore, if the petitioner is then actually transferred to DHS custody, a
habeas petition based on the detainer may become moot. Guzman v. Conn. Dept.
of Corr., No. 3:03CV1532, 2005 WL 368038 (D. Conn. 2005); see Baez, supra note
98.
152. See Comm’n for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma County. v. County. Of
Sonoma, No. 3:08-cv-04220-PJH (N.D. Cal.) (docket entry 1, Complaint, ¶¶ 67–68,
76–81) (complaint for damages based on violation of INA section 287, 8 U.S.C. §
1357 and injunctive relief and a declaration that 8 C.F.R. section 287.7 is ultra vires
and invalid); see Fullerton, supra note 148 (suggesting Bivens damages action is
remedy for County of Riverside violation).
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